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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
this creates uncertainties and sometimes does violence to sound legal
theory. Some of the uncertainties might be avoided if the legislative
bodies drafting statutes involving remarriage and if the judges drafting
alimony decrees would spell out to a greater extent what is meant by
remarriage.
KARL N. HILL, JR.
Searches and Seizures-Description in Warrant-Limits of Curtilage
A recent North Carolina case has presented some unique problems
in the admissibility of evidence found in the process of an unreasonable
search and seizure.' 'Vithin the same yard were two buildings, some
thirty feet apart. The first building was a house, owned and occupied
by a third party. The second building was a former filling station,
rented from the third party and occupied by the defendant. A search
warrant was obtained for the house against the third party and another
for the filling station against the defendant. The affidavit described
the defendant's "dwelling, garage, filling station, barn and outhouses and
cars and premises .... ,,2 The officer searched the filling station.
While searching the house of the third party the sheriff discovered,
for the first time, that the defendant also rented a back porch room of
the house. Despite the fact that neither the owner of the robm nor the
defendant gave his consent, the officer searched the room under the
warrant for the house. The court excluded the evidence found in the
room because it was seized in the course of an unreasonable search.
The court reached this decision upon the grounds: (1) that as
between the third party and the defendant, the defendant had the right
to invoke the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure, (2) the warrant for the search of the house did not authorize a
search of the back porch room. Thus the decision of the court did not
turn upon the question of search within the curtilage. But the facts
of the case necessarily suggest this problem. The room was close
enough to be said to be in the defendant's curtilage, being within the
same yard and within thirty feet of his dwelling. There was a path
from the filling station to the room and it would appear that the room
was used by the defendant in connection with the filling station as a
habitation.3 That this problem presented itself to the minds of the
1 State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d 329 (1957).
2Id. at 240, 98 S.E.2d at 331.
'Apparently the limits of the curtilage are set by two primary elements: the
use of the lands and buildings in connection with the dwelling for ordinary habita-
tion and the proximity to the dwelling. State v. Lee, 120 Ore. 643, 253 Pac. 533
(1927). There is no longer any requirement that this area be enclosed by a wall
or fence, as was the case in England. Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 94
S.E. 168 (1917).
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court is indicated by the fact that at the outset of the decision the court
adumbrated the point. But the court refused to hold the room an out-
house within the curtilage of the defendant's dwelling because "out-
house" was not a proper description of the room. 4 The holding of the
court is in line with the policy of strict interpretation of the unreason-
able search and seizure protection in favor of the defendant.5
But what are some of the problems involved in the relation of the
search warrant to the curtilage? It is well settled that the concept of
curtilage applies only to enlarge the protection afforded the defendant
against search without a warrant.6  It does not serve to extend the
bounds of a search warrant which does not specify a particular building
within the curtilage.7  The theory of curtilage can not be transplanted
from the realm of protecting the defendant against search without a
warrant to extending the bounds of the warrant. Search with a war-
rant is limited to those premises specifically described in the warrant,
not the premises so described plus their curtilage.8
This conclusion may lead to some difficulty if the officer finds it
necessary to search the entire property of the defendant who owns a
house near which are several structures and outlying fields. The out-
lying fields may be searched up to the bounds of the curtilage without
a search warrant, since the constitutional protection extends only to
"persons, houses, papers and effects." 9
How may the warrant describe the house and its curtilage so as
to achieve a legal search of the entire area? There are some cases which
allow a very limited search within the curtilage of dwellings not spe-
cifically described in the warrant. In one case the search warrant called
for the search of "one frame house, barns, smokehouse, and other out-
'Another element which seemed to play a part in the court's refusal to uphold
the filling station Warrant as good against the search of the room was the fear that
by doing so there would be an invasion of the rights of another property owner.
Search of two separate yards has been permitted, when connected by a path
and owned by one person. People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250 (1851). But this has
not been permitted where the two yards belong to two different people. When
there was such a search, even when specified in the warrant, it was held invalid
as a general search. State v. Duane, 100 Me. 447, 62 Atl. 80 (1905).
'79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures § 4 (1952).
' State v. Harrison, 239 N.C. 659, 80 S.E.2d 481 (1954) ; Kisselburg v. State,
56 Okl. Cr. 46, 33 P.2d 236 (1934).
" People v. Bawiec, 228 Mich. 32, 199 N.W. 702 (1924).
8 MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 35, 36 (1950).
'Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); State v. Harrison, 239 N.C.
659, 80 S.E.2d 481 (1954). However, in some states even the open fields are held
to be within the protection against search without a warrant. These states have
interpreted the inclusion of "possessions" among the list of things protected in the
state constitutions to mean that anything possessed by the defendant is protected
from search without a warrant. Miller v. State, 174 Md. 362, 198 Atl. 710 (1938) ;
Helton v. State, 136 Miss. 622, 101 So. 701 (1924). At least one state, with such
a provision in its constitution, has expressly repudiated this doctrine and held
that open fields may be searched without a search warrant. Robie v. State, 117
Tex. Cr. 283, 36 S.W. 2d 175 (1931).
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buildings . . . ."10 There was no reference in the warrant to the
grounds on which these buildings stood. But when illegal whiskey was
found in a garden ten to twenty feet from the dwelling, the court held
that the whiskey was found in a search authorized by the warrant. In
holding the search to be reasonable the court said: "[T]he description
as a whole means rather the premises occupied by the defendant as a
residence, including the named buildings, as well as such adjacent lands
as were necessary parts of the 'premises ... ."-11 But the same court,
in a later case, indicated that it would not be so liberal if the omitted
place-were a building. When the warrant merely specified the dwell-
ing, the same court did not allow any portion of the curtilage to be
searched. 12  A Tennessee case illustrates the furthest extension of an
allowance to search the curtilage when the warrant specifies only the
dwelling.' 3 The warrant authorized a search of the premises at "2706
Coward Street." Within three feet of the main building was a coal
house also marked "2706." The court allowed the search of the coal
house under the warrant because there was a search "of an outhouse
so clearly appurtenant to and a part of the same precises .... ,11 But
it would appear that this court did not hold that the curtilage can be
searched when only the house is described, but rather that the coal house
was constructively the same building as the house.
Since search within the curtilage when only the dwelling is described
in the search warrant is so strictly limited, the officer has no alternative
but to specify all objects within the curtilage which he wishes to
search. 15 It is submitted that the officer would be well advised to inform
himself of as many details of the layout of the premises to be searched
as possible." When he finds a peculiar situation, like that in the prin-
" Ingram v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 284, 286, 254 S.W. 894, 895 (1923).
221 d. at 286, 254 S.W. at 895.
"Fleming v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 169, 289 S.W. 212 (1926).
13 Seals v. State, 157 Tenn. 538, 11 S.W.2d 879 (1928).
1, Id. at 545, 11 S.W.2d at 881.
The term "premises" in itself presents a problem when applied to search
warrants. In trespass cases and litigation over deeds or wills it would seem
that the term may be used in its broadest sense to include the entire property
appurtenant to a specified building or general site. Winlock v. State, 121 Ind.
531, 23 N.E. 514 (1890). But when the term is used in a search warrant it is
more strictly construed as the approximate equivalent of the curtilage. Ratzell v.
State, 27 Okl. Cr. 340, 228 Pac. 166 (1924). But "premises" standing alone in a
search warrant is not sufficiently specific to permit a search. Its meaning, un-
accompanied by qualifying words or phrases, is so indefinite that the premises to be
searched are not specified adequately. Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464 (1850) ; Rig-
nall v. State. 134 Miss. 169, 98 So. 444 (1923). But "premises" plus a street ad-
dress authorizes a search of a garage on the same lot as the house. Comeaux v.
State, 118 Tex. Cr. 223, 42 S.W.2d 255 (1931).
15 It has been held that a single search warrant may specify not only a dwellinv,
but also buildinds and land within the same curtilage. Caudill v. Commonwealth,
198 Ky. 695, 249 S.W. 1005 (1923). See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 864 (1953), as to
the propriety of issuing only one search warrant to search more than one place or
premise occupied by the same person.
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cipal case, specific details should not be used to the exclusion of general
terms. General terms such as "out houses," "yard," and "garden" are
common and have proved effective. 16
JAMES W. KIRKPATRICK, JR.
Taxation-Barred Claims-Equitable Recoupment
Plaintiff, as administratrix, paid estate tax on her deceased hus-
band's estate. After the period of limitations on claim for refund of
the estate tax had expired, the Commissioner assessed against the estate
a deficiency assessment for income taxes and penalties. The plaintiff
paid same and sought a refund of estate tax to accord with the resultant
decrease of the taxable estate, but was denied recovery in the district
court' because of a three year statute of limitations on refund of estate
tax.2 The plaintiff then brought suit for refund of income tax, seeking
to recoup the estate tax overpayments against the income tax deficiency
assessments, a refund of which the statute of limitations had not yet
barred. The court allowed full recovery with interest.3
The doctrine of recoupment, an equitable remedy of common law
origin, is the act of rebating a part of a claim on which one is sued, by
means of a legal or equitable right resulting from a counterclaim arising
out of the same transaction. 4 In Bull v. United States,5 the first case
in which this remedy was extended to federal taxation, the United
States Supreme Court limited recoupment to situations arising out of
"some feature of the same transaction upon which the plaintiff's claim
is grounded."6 The basic problem in recoupment cases stems from the
difficulty in determining what constitutes the same transaction.
Four times the Supreme Court has considered the matter of recoup-
1" Here follow some examples of descriptions in search warrants that were
held valid:
"a certain dwelling house, barn, garage, outbuildings and sheds located at ... 
People v. Holton, 326 Ill. 481, 158 N.E. 134 (1927); "room, house, outhouse,
yard, garden and appurtenances thereto . . . ." Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 662, 87
N.E. 103 (1909); "building and all out buildings commonly known as . .. ."
Thomson v. State, 196 Ind. 229, 147 N.E. 778 (1925); "one story frame house
and all outbuildings appurtenant thereto . . . " Goodman v. State, 201 Ind. 189,
165 N.E. 755 (1929).
1 Herring v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.C. 1955).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 910, 53 STAT. 138 (now INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954,§ 6511).
United States v. Herring, 240 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1957).
80 C.J.S., Set-Off and Counterclaim § 2 (1953).
295 U.S. 247 (1935). Decedent's estate was substituted in decedent's place
in a partnership and received income therefrom. The Commissioner first incor-
rectly levied estate tax on the sum so received and, after suit for refund of this
tax was barred, he levied income tax on the same sum. The Court allowed the
taxpayer to recoup the barred estate tax overpayment against the income tax de-
ficiency correctly due on the sum.
Old. at 262.
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